We show how different kinds of belief operators derived from preferences can be defined in terms an accessibility relation of epistemic priority, and characterized by means of a vector of nested accessibility relations. The semantic structure enables us to compare and reconcile certain nonstandard notions of belief that have recently been used in epistemic analyses of games. D
Introduction
During the last few years, certain non-monotonic belief operators have played an important role in contributions seeking to provide epistemic foundations for gametheoretic solution concepts, especially concepts promoting forward induction in extensive games. These non-standard belief operators include Stalnaker's (1998) dabsolutely robust beliefT, Brandenburger and Keisler's (2002) dassumptionT, Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) dstrong beliefT, and Asheim and Dufwenberg's (2003) dfull beliefT. However, in their appearance, these operators are different, and the contributions in which they are defined offer little help in understanding whether these differences entail that the concepts are different also in substance. It is this paper's main purpose to present a unifying framework in which the non-monotonic operators of Stalnaker (1998) , Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) , Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) , and Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) can be compared and reconciled.
In their appearance, the four non-standard operators differ in many respects:
(1) dStrong beliefT is derived from dconditional belief with probability oneT, an event is dassumedT if preference conditional on the dassumedT event implies unconditional preference, and an event is dfully believedT if weak dominance on the dfully believedT event entails unconditional preference. In contrast, dabsolutely robust beliefT is defined using an accessibility relation of epistemic priority.
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(2) While Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) assume that the decision maker is endowed with complete preferences determining the relative likelihood of states, it is essential for Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) to allow for incomplete preferences. Moreover, Stalnaker's (1998) accessibility relation encodes epistemic priority, but not the relative likelihood of states at the same epistemic level. (3) In the frameworks used by Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) , the decision maker may deem the true state subjectively impossible, while the structures of Stalnaker (1998) , and Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) do not allow for this.
To accommodate these differences, we must consider a unifying framework. Following the structure illustrated in Fig. 1 , we start in Section 2 with the preferences of the decision maker and, from these, derive the accessibility relation of epistemic priority, which in turn is used to define different kinds of subjective belief operators, thus accommodating the differences described in point (1). In epistemic analyses of games, it is common to use subjective belief operators; examples are dbelief with probability oneT (Tan and Werlang, 1988) , dbelief with primary probability oneT (Brandenburger, 1992) , and dconditional belief with probability oneT (Ben-Porath, 1997) . While in these examples the operators are based on subjective probabilities that represent the preferences of the decision maker, Morris (1997) observes that it is unnecessary to go via subjective probabilities to derive subjective belief operators from the preferences of a decision maker. We follow his suggestion.
Since we do not rely on subjective probabilities, we can drop completeness by imposing decision-theoretic axioms that are weaker than those usually applied in the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) framework, and thereby accommodate the differences of point (2). In line with Aumann (1962, p. 446 ) one can question whether brationalityQ demands definite preference comparisons between all alternatives. Furthermore, preferences need not satisfy completeness to determine dsubjective possibilityT and depistemic priorityT, which are the essential building blocks when deriving belief operators from preferences. 1 The term depistemic priorityT will here be used to refer to what elsewhere is sometimes referred to as dplausibilityT or dprejudiceT; see, e.g., Friedman and Halpern (1995) and Lamarre and Shoham (1994) . This is similar to dpreferenceT among states (or worlds) in nonmonotonic logic (cf. Shoham, 1988; Kraus et al., 1990) , leading agents towards some states and away from others. In contrast, we use the term dpreferencesT in the decision-theoretic sense of a binary relation on the set of functions (dactsT) from states to outcomes; see Section 2.
The binary accessibility relation of epistemic priority Q-derived from preferences in Section 3 through the dinfinitely-more-likelyT relation-is similar to but more general than those found, e.g., in Lamarre and Shoham (1994) and Stalnaker (1996 Stalnaker ( , 1998 in that reflexivity is not required, thus accommodating the differences described in point (3). Furthermore, we show how preferences through dadmissibilityT give rise to a vector of nested binary accessibility relations (R 1 , . . ., R L ), where, for each k, R k fulfills the usual properties of Kripke representations of beliefs; i.e., they are serial, transitive and Euclidean. Finally, we establish that the two kinds of accessibility relations yield two equivalent representations of dsubjective possibilityT and depistemic priorityT.
In Section 4 we use the accessibility relation of epistemic priority Q to define:
Á Certain belief coinciding with what Morris (1997) calls dSavage-beliefT and entailing that the complement of the event is subjectively impossible.
Á Conditional belief generalizing dconditional belief with probability oneT. Á Robust belief coinciding with Stalnaker's (1998) dabsolutely robust beliefT.
We then characterize these operators by means of the vector of nested binary accessibility relations (R 1 , . . ., R L ), thereby showing that Asheim and Dufwenberg's (2003) concept of dfull beliefT coincides with robust belief. In Section 5 we establish that the robust belief operator (while poorly behaved) is bounded by certain and conditional belief, which are KD45 operators.
In Section 6 we observe that the characterization of robust belief corresponds to Brandenburger and Keisler's (2002) concept of dassumptionT, while in Section 7 we show how the definition of robust belief is closely related to Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) concept of dstrong beliefT, thus concluding our comparison of the four non-standard notions of belief.
In Sections 2-6 of this paper we follow Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) and Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) and assume that conditional preferences are derived from the decision maker's unconditional preferences. In the words of Stalnaker (1998, p. 40) , if decision makers are rational, then bwhat they will decide to do when a certain situation arises can be assumed to be the same as what they now will decide that they would do if that situation were to ariseQ. Since Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) differ in this respect by assuming that the decision maker is endowed with a system of conditional preferences, special care is taken when considering the dstrong beliefT operator in Section 7.
Throughout we follow Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) , Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) , and Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) by adopting an interim perspective where the decision maker has already become aware of his own preferences (his own btypeQ); hence, the decision maker's unconditional preferences are not obtained by conditioning bex ante preferencesQ on his type.
By having a subjective perspective, this paper follows Feinberg (in press). However, Feinberg's framework for subjective reasoning differs from the present approach by not constraining beliefs to be evolving or revised, but being represented whenever there is a decision to be made.
Decision-theoretic framework
We introduce the decision-theoretic axioms on which the present analysis builds, and use this framework to define the concept of an epistemic model.
Axioms
Let W be a finite set of states (or possible worlds). Consider a decision maker under uncertainty. The decision maker is uncertain about what state in W will be realized. Let Z be a finite set of outcomes. In the tradition of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , the decision maker is endowed with preferences over all functions that to each element of W assign an objective randomization on Z. Any such function x: WYD(Z) is called an act on W. As motivated in Section 2.2, the decision maker's preferences over acts differ between states. Hence, if the true state is a, then the preferences of the decision maker is a binary relation v a on the set of acts on W, with d a and~a denoting the asymmetric and symmetric parts, respectively.
The Ancombe-Aumann representation of preferences over acts in terms of a von Neumann-Morgestern utility function over outcomes and a subjective probability distribution over states can be derived from the following five axioms, where the numbering of axioms follows Blume et al. (1991) .
Axiom 1 (Order). v a is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Objective independence). xVd a (resp.~a) xW iff cxV+(1Àc)yd a (resp.~a) cxW+(1Àc)y, whenever 0bcb1 and y is arbitrary.
Axiom 3 (Nontriviality). There exist x and y such that xd a y.
Axiom 4 (Archimedean property). If xVd a yd a xW, then a0bcbdb1 such that dxV+(1Àd)xWd a yd a cxV+(1Àc)xW.
For the fifth axiom, the following definitions are needed. If (t p)/pW, let x / denote the restriction of x to /. Define the conditional preferences v / a by xVv / a xW if, for some y, (x / V, y I/ )v a (x / W, y I/ ), where I/ denotes W\/. By objective independence this definition does not depend on y. Say that the state baW is Savage-null at a if x~{ b} a y for all acts x and y on W; this will be interpreted as b being deemed subjectively impossible at a.
Axiom 5 (Non-null state independence). xd {b} a y iff xd {c} a y, whenever b and c are not Savage-null, and x and y satisfy x(b)=x(c) and y(b)=y(c). Blume et al. (1991, Theorem 3 .1) obtain their representation of preferences over acts in terms of a von Neumann-Morgestern utility function over outcomes and a lexicographic probability system (LPS)-i.e., a hierarchy of subjective probability distributions that are used sequentially to resolve ties-over states by replacing Axiom 4 with the following weaker axiom.
In this paper we go even further by replacing Axiom 1 with the following two axioms, where, for the statement of the latter, we must introduce the dinfinitely-more-likelyT relation: Say that b is deemed infinitely more likely than c at a (bH a c; cf. Blume et al., 1991; Definition 5.1) if bpc, b is not Savage-null at a, and xd {b} a y implies xd {b,c} a y. According to this definition, c may, but need not, be Savage-null at a if bH a c. That bH a c will be interpreted as b having higher epistemic priority than c at a.
Axiom 1V (Conditional order). v a is reflexive and transitive and, 8baW, v {b} a is complete.
Axiom 6 (Partitional priority). If bH a c, then 8bVaW, bH a bV or bVH a c.
The main analysis of this paper, from this section through Section 5, builds on Axioms 1V, 2, 3, 4V, 5, and 6. While it is straightforward that Axiom 1 implies Axiom 1V, and Axiom 4 implies Axiom 4V it is less obvious that Axioms 1, 2, and 4V imply Axiom 6. This is demonstrated by the following proposition. The proof of this and other results are contained in Appendix A. Proposition 1. Axioms 1, 2, and 4V imply Axiom 6.
Hence, the set of axioms consisting of Axioms 1V, 2, 3, 4V, 5, and 6 is weaker than the one used by Blume et al. (1991) in their representation of preferences by means of LPSs. Axiom 1V constitutes a substantive weakening of Axiom 1 since it means (in the terminology of Anscombe and Aumann, 1963 ) that the decision maker has complete preferences over broulette lotteriesQ where objective probabilities are exogenously given, but not necessarily complete preferences over bhorse lotteriesQ where subjective probabilities, if determined, are endogenously derived from the preferences of the decision maker.
Still, conditional representation of preferences in the following sense is possible. Say that v a is conditionally represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u a : ZYR (writing u a (x)= P zaZ x(z)u a (z) whenever xaD(Z) is an objective randomization) if
(1) v a is nontrivial and (2) xv {b} a y iff u a (x(b))zu a (y(b)) whenever b is not Savage-null at a. By Axioms 1V, 2, 3, 4V, and 5 it follows directly from the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem on expected utility representation that there exists a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u a such that v a is conditionally represented by u a . If ApW, say that x A weakly dominates y A at a if, 8baA, u a (x A (b))zu a (y A (b)), with strict inequality for some caA. Say that v a is admissible on A if A is non-empty and xd a y whenever x A weakly dominates y A at a.
The following connection between admissibility on subsets and the infinitely-morelikely relation is important for relating the accessibility relations derived from preferences in Section 3.3.
Proposition 2. Let A p t and IA p t, and assume that v a satisfies Axioms 1V, 2, 3, 4V, and 5. Then v a is admissible on A iff baA and ca IA imply bH a c.
An epistemic model
In a semantic formulation of belief operators one can, following Aumann (1999) , start with an information partition of W, and then assume that the decision maker, for each element of the partition, is endowed with a probability distribution that is concentrated on this element of the partition. Since all states within one element of the partition are indistinguishable, they are assigned the same probability distribution, which however differ from the probability distributions assigned to states outside this element. In particular, probability distributions assigned to two states in different elements of the partition have disjoint supports. Hence, in Aumann's (1999) formulation, the decision maker's probability distribution depends on in which element of the information partition the true state is. This is consistent with the approach chosen here, where the probability distribution-or more generally, the preferences-of the decision maker will be different for states in different elements of the information partition, and be the same for all states within the same element. However, in line with our subjective perspective, we will construct the information partition from the preferences of the decision maker, so that each element of the partition is defined as a maximal set of states where the decision maker's preferences are the same, having the interpretation that states within this set are indistinguishable. Moreover, Aumann's (1999) assumption that the probability distribution is concentrated within the corresponding element of the partition will in our framework be captured by the property that all states outside (and possibly some states inside) the element are deemed subjectively impossible.
Thus, for each aaW, let s a :={baWjxv b y iff xv a y} be the set of states that are subjectively indistinguishable at a, and write acb if bas a . Note that c is a reflexive, transitive, and symmetric binary relation; i.e., c is an equivalence relation that partitions W into equivalence classes (or btypesQ).
Moreover, let j a denote the set of states that are subjectively possible (i.e., not Savagenull) at a. Since v a satisfies Axiom 3, it follows that j a pt. In line with the above discussion, assume that, for each aaW, j a ps a . This assumption will ensure that the preference-based operators satisfy positive and negative introspection; it corresponds to bbeing aware of one's own typeQ.
Definition 1. An epistemic model {v
a jaaW} consists of
(1) a finite set of states W that is partitioned into equivalence classes by c, (2) for each aaW, a binary relation v a on the set of acts (where each act is a function x: WYD(Z) and Z is a finite set of outcomes), depending only on which equivalence class a belongs to, and satisfying Axioms 1V, 2, 3, 4V, 5, and 6, and that acb if b is not Savage-null at a.
From preferences to accessibility relations
The purpose of this section is to show how two different kinds of accessibility relations (see, e.g., Lamarre and Shoham, 1994; Stalnaker, 1996 Stalnaker, , 1998 can be derived from preferences, thereby reconciling the setting in which Stalnaker's dabsolutely robust beliefT is defined with the preference-based frameworks of Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) , Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) , and Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) . The one kind is based on the infinitely-more-likely relation, while the other is based on admissibility on subsets.
To describe the properties of accessibility relations, the following terminology will be used: An accessibility relation R ! is reflexive if 8a, aRa, ! is serial if 8a, ab such that aRb, ! is transitive if aRb and bRc imply aRc, ! is Euclidean if aRb and aRc imply bRc, ! satisfies forward linearity if aRb and aRc imply bRc or cRb, 2 ! satisfies quasi-backward linearity if, whenever aaVaW such that aVRb, aRc, and bRc imply aRb or bRa. 
Accessibility relation of epistemic priority
Consider the following definition of the accessibility relation Q.
Definition 2. aQb (ba does not have higher epistemic priority than bQ) if
(1) acb, (2) b is not Savage-null at a, and (3) a is not deemed infinitely more likely than b at a.
Proposition 3. In an epistemic model having the properties specified in Definition 1, the relation Q is serial, transitive, and satisfies forward linearity and quasi-backward linearity.
A vector of nested accessibility relations
Consider the collection of all sets A satisfying that v a is admissible on A. Since v a is admissible on j a , it follows that the collection is non-empty as it is contains j a . Also, since no baA is Savage-null at a if v a is admissible on A, it follows that any set in this collection is a subset of j a . Finally, since bH a c implies that cH a b does not hold, it follows from Proposition 2 that AVpAW or AWpAV if v a is admissible on both AV and AW, implying that the sets in the collection are nested. Hence, there exists a vector of nested sets, (q 1 a , . . ., q L a a ), on which v a is admissible, satisfying: 
(where, for two utility vectors v and w, vz L w denotes that, whenever w S Nv S , there exists kbS such that v k Nw k ). In this case, (q 1 a , . . ., q L a a ) can in an obvious way be derived from the supports of these probability distributions:
in a context where a system of conditional probabilities is taken as primitive. In a similar context, van Fraassen (1976) and Arló -Costa and Parith (2003) propose a concept of (belief/probability) cores that correspond to the sets q 1 a , . . ., q L a a . Grove (1988) spheres and Spohn's (1988) ordinal conditional functions are also related to these sets.
For aaW with
The collection {q k a jaaW} defines an accessibility relation R k .
Definition 3. aR k b (bat a, b is deemed possible at the epistemic level kQ) if baq k a .
Proposition 4. In an epistemic model having the properties specified in Definition 1, the vector of relations, (R 1 , . . ., R L ), has the following properties: For each ka{1, . . ., L}, R k is serial, transitive, and Euclidean. For each ka{1,. . .,LÀ1}, (i) aR k b implies aR k+1 b and (ii) (ac such that aR k+1 c and bR k+1 c) implies (ac V such that aR k c V and bR k c V).
The correspondence between Q and (
That a is not Savage-null at a we interpret as a being deemed subjectively possible (at some epistemic level) at any state in the same equivalence class. By part (i) of the following result, a being not Savage-null at a has two equivalent representations in terms of accessibility relations: aQa and aR L a. Likewise, we interpret bH a a as b having higher epistemic priority than a. By part (ii) of the following result, bH a a have two equivalent representations: (aQb and not bQa) and (aka{1, . . ., L} such that aR k b and not bR k a). Thus, both Q and (R 1 , . . ., R L ) capture dsubjective possibilityT and depistemic priorityT as implied by the preferences of the epistemic model. Proposition 5. In an epistemic model having the properties specified in Definition 1, the following equivalences hold: (i) aQa iff aR L a. (ii) (aQb and not bQa) iff (aka{1, . . ., L} such that aR k b and not bR k a).
If Axiom 4 is substituted for Axiom 4V-so that the conditional Archimedean property is strengthened to the Archimedean property-then b being deemed infinitely more likely than c at a implies that c is Savage-null. Hence, L=1, and by Definitions 2 and 3, Q=R 1 . Hence, we are left with a unique serial, transitive, and Euclidean accessibility relation if preferences are continuous.
Defining and characterizing belief operators
In line with the basic structure illustrated in Fig. 1 , we now use the accessibility relations of Section 3 to define and characterize belief operators.
Defining certain, conditional, and robust belief
Consider the accessibility relation of epistemic priority, Q, having the properties of Proposition 3. 4 Define dcertain beliefT as follows. Hence, at a an event A is certainly believed if the complement is deemed subjectively impossible at a. This coincides with what Morris (1997) calls dSavage-beliefT.
dConditional beliefT is defined conditionally on sets that are subjectively possible at any state; i.e., sets in the following collection:
Hence, a non-empty set / is not in U if and only if there exists aaW such that j a \/=t. Note that WaU and, 8/aU, t=/pW. Since every /aU is subjectively possible at any state, it follows that, 8/aU,
is non-empty, as demonstrated by the following lemma.
Define dconditional beliefT as follows. 4 We have earlier shown (in Asheim and Søvik, 2003) how equivalence classes can be derived from Q with the properties of Proposition 3, implying that Q with such properties suffices for defining the belief operators. In particular, we show that the set of states that are subjective indistinguishable at a is given by s a ¼ baW jacaW such that aQc and bQcg; f and the set of states that are deemed subjectively possible at a equals j a ¼ bas a jacaW such that cQbg ¼ bas a jbQbg; f f where j a a t since Q is serial, and where the last equality follows since, by quasi-backward, linearity, bQb if cQb.
Definition 5. At a the decision maker believes A conditional on / if aaB(/)A, where
Hence, at a an event A is believed conditional on / if A contains any state in s a \/ with at least as high epistemic priority as any other state in s a \/. This way of defining conditional belief is in the tradition of, e.g., Grove (1988) , Boutilier (1994) , and Lamarre and Shoham (1994) .
Let U A be the collection of subjectively possible events / having the property that A is subjectively possible conditional on / whenever A is subjectively possible:
Hence, a non-empty set / is not in U A if and only if (1) there exists aaW such that j a \/=t; or (2) there exists aaW such that A\j a p t and A\j a \/= t. Note that U A is a subset of U that satisfies WaU A ; hence, tpU A pU. Define drobust beliefT as follows.
Definition 6. At a the decision maker robustly believes A if aaB 0 A, where
Hence, at a an event A is robustly believed in the following sense: A is believed conditional on any event / that does not make A subjectively impossible. Indeed, B 0 coincides with what Stalnaker (1998) calls dabsolutely robust beliefT when we specialize to his setting where Q is also reflexive. The relation between this belief operator and the operators dfull beliefT, dassumptionT, and dstrong beliefT, introduced by Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) , Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) , and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) , respectively, will be investigated in Sections 4.2, 6, and 7.
Characterizing certain, conditional, and robust belief
Consider the vector of nested accessibility relations (R 1 , . . ., R L ) having the properties of Proposition 4 and being related to Q as in Proposition 5. 5 Recall that, for any ka {1, . . ., L}, q k a ={baW|aR k b}. Since j a =q L a , certain belief can be characterized as follows.
Proposition 6. KA={aaW|q L a pA}. Finally, by Proposition 5(ii) and the following result, A is robustly believed iff any subjectively possible state in A has higher epistemic priority than any state in the same equivalence class outside A.
Proposition 8. B 0 A={aaW|aka{1, . . ., L} such that q k a =A\j a }. Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) say that an event A is dfully believedT at a if the preferences at a are admissible on the set of states in A that are deemed subjectively possible at a. It follows from Proposition 8 that this coincides with robust belief as defined in Definition 6.
Properties of belief operators
The present section establishes some properties of certain, conditional, and robust belief operators. We do not seek to establish sound and complete axiomatic systems for these operators; this should, however, be standard for the certain and conditional belief operators, while harder to establish for the robust belief operator. Rather, our main goal is to show how the poorly behaved robust belief operator is bounded by the two KD45 operators certain and conditional belief. While the results of Sections 5.1 and 5.2 are included as a background for the results of Section 5.3, the latter findings in combination with the results of Sections 4.2, 6, and 7 shed light on the non-standard notions of belief recently used in epistemic analyses of games.
Properties of certain and conditional belief
Note that certain belief implies conditional belief since, by Definitions 4 and 5, b a (/)pj a \/.
Proposition 9. For any /aU, KApB(/)A.
Furthermore, combined with Proposition 9 the following result implies that both operators K and B(/) correspond to KD45 systems.
Proposition 10. For any /aU, the following properties hold:
Note that Kt =t, B(/)W=W, B(/)ApB(/)B(/)A and IB(/)ApB(/)( IB(/)A) follow from Proposition 10 since KApB(/)A.
Since an event can be certainly believed even though the true state is an element of the complement of the event, it follows that neither operator satisfies the truth axiom (i.e. KApA and B(/)ApA need not hold).
Belief revision
Conditional belief satisfies the usual properties for belief revision as given by Stalnaker (1998) ; see also Alchourró n et al. (1985) . To show this we must define the set, b a , that determines the decision maker's unconditional belief at the state a:
a =b a (W). Then the following result can be established.
Proposition 11.
(
Properties of robust belief
It is straightforward to show that certain belief implies robust belief, which in turn implies (unconditional) belief.
Although robust belief is thus bounded by two KD45 operators, robust belief is not itself a KD45 operator.
Proposition 13. The following properties hold:
Note 
Relation to the dassumptionT operator
This section shows how the robust belief operator corresponds to the dassumptionT operator of Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) . For this purpose, consider the following axiom, implied by Axiom 4 and implying Axiom 4V. 
Axiom 4W (Partitional Archimedean property

Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) consider an epistemic model which
! is more general than the one that we consider in Definition 1, since the set of states need not be finite, and ! is more special than ours, since, for all aaW, Axioms 1V, 4V, and 6 are strengthened to Axioms 1 and 4W, so that completeness and the partitional Archimedean property are substituted for conditional completeness, partitional priority, and the conditional Archimedean property.
Within our setting with a finite set of states, W, it now follows from Blume et al. (1991, Theorem 5. 3) that v a is represented by u a and a lexicographic conditional probability system (LCPS)-i.e., a hierarchy of subjective probability distributions with non-overlapping supports where the support of the k-level probability distribution l Provided that completeness and the partitional Archimedean property are satisfied, Brandenburger and Keisler (2002, Definition B1) (see also Brandenburger and Friedenberg, 2003) introduce the following belief operator.
Definition 7 (Brandenburger and Keisler, 2002) . At a, the decision maker assumes A if v A a is nontrivial and xd A a y implies xd a y.
Proposition 14. Consider an epistemic model having the properties specified in Definition 1, and where in addition, for all aaW, v a satisfies Axioms 1 and 4W. Then B 0 A={aaW|A is assumed at a}. Proposition 14 shows that the dassumptionT operator coincides with robust belief (and thus with Stalnaker's (1998) dabsolutely robust beliefT) under completeness and the partitional Archimedean property.
However, if the partitional Archimedean property is weakened to the conditional Archimedean property, then this equivalence is not obtained. To see this, let j a ={a, b, c}, and let the preferences v a , in addition to the properties of Definition 1, also satisfy completeness. It then follows from Blume et al. (1991, Theorem 3 .1) that v a is represented by u a and a LPS-i.e., a hierarchy of subjective probability distributions with possibly overlapping supports. Consider the example provided by Blume et al. (1991, Section 5) of a two-level LPS k a =(l 1 a , l 2 a ), where the primary probability distribution, l 1 a , is given by l 1 a (a)=1/2 and l 1 a (b)=1/2, and the secondary probability distribution, l 2 a , used to resolve ties, is given by l 2 a (a)=1/2 and l 2 a (c)=1/2. Consider the acts x and y, where u a (x(a))=2, u a (x(b))=0, and u a (x(c))=0, and where u a (y(a))=1, u a (y(b))=1, and u a (y(c))=2. Although v a is admissible on {a, b}, and thus {a, b} is robustly believed at a, it follows that {a,b} is not dassumedT at a since xd {a, b} a y while x0 a y. Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) do not indicate that their definition-as stated in Definition 7-should be used outside the realm of preferences that satisfy the partitional Archimedean property. Hence, our definition of robust belief-combined with the characterization result of Proposition 8 and its interpretation in term of admissibility-yields a preference-based generalization of Brandenburger and Keisler's (2002) operator (in our setting with a finite set of states) to preferences that need only satisfy the properties of Definition 1.
Relation to the dstrong beliefT operator
In the setting of extensive form games, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) have suggested a non-monotonic dstrong beliefT operator. This section shows how their dstrong beliefT operator is related to robust belief, and thereby, to dabsolutely robust beliefT of Stalnaker (1998) , dfull beliefT of Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) , and dassumptionT of Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) . Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) base their dstrong beliefT operator on a conditional belief operator derived from an epistemic model where, for each state aaW, the decision maker is endowed with a system of conditional preferences {v / a |/aU a } (with, as before, U a denoting {/a2 W \{t}|j a \/ p t}). However, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) assume that, if the true state is a, then the decision maker's system of conditional preferences is represented by u a and a conditional probability system (CPS) {l / a |/aU a }. That is, for each /aU a , l / a is a subjective probability distribution on / such that
() whenever p/p/V and /, /VaU a . Since this allows for the possibility that l / a ()N0 and l W a ()=0, provided that l W a (/)=0, we may have xVd / a xW and (x / V, y I/ )~W a (x / V, y I/ ), contradicting how conditional preferences are defined elsewhere in this paper.
To embed Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) conditional belief operator in the framework of the current paper we invoke the following result, noted by Blume et al. (1991, p. 72) and discussed by Hammond (1994) and Halpern (2003) .
Proposition 15. For given von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u a : D Z ð ÞYR, the following two statements are equivalent.
(1) There is a unique CPS {l / a |/aU a } such that, for any /aU a , l / a satisfies (*).
. ., L a }, suppl k a =p k a and {p 1 a , . . ., p L a a } partitioning j a -such that, for any /aU a , the conditional of l S a on /, with S := min {k| suppl k a \/ p t}, satisfies (*).
One the one hand, Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Ben-Porath (1997) define dconditional belief with probability oneT in the following way: At a the decision maker believes A conditional on /aU if suppl / a pA. On the other hand, according to Definition 5 of the present paper, at a the decision maker believes A conditional on /aU if b a (/)pA. If, however, Axioms 1V, 4V, and 6 are strengthened to Axioms 1 and 4V, so that v a is represented by u a and an LCPS, k a =(l 1 a , . . ., l L a a ), then Lemma 2 of Appendix A implies that b a (/)=suppl S a \/, where S :=min {k| suppl k a \/ p t}. Hence, by Proposition 15, dconditional belief with probability oneT as defined by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Ben-Porath (1997) is isomorphic to the conditional belief operator B(/) derived from an epistemic model satisfying the assumptions of Definition 1 of the present paper.
Given that the conditional belief operator of Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) thus coincides with B(/), we can define their dstrong beliefT operator as follows: Let U H (pU) be some non-empty subcollection of the collection of subsets that are subjectively possible at any state; e.g., in an extensive game U H may consist of the subsets that correspond to subgames. Then U H \U A is the collection of subsets / satisfying /aU H and having the property that A is subjectively possible conditional on / whenever A is subjectively possible.
Definition 8 (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002) . At a, the decision maker strongly believes
Hence, at a, an event A is strongly believed if A is robustly believed in the following sense: A is believed conditional on any subset / in U H that does not make A subjectively impossible. Since U A tU H \U A t{W}, it follows that the dstrong beliefT operator is bounded by the robust belief and (unconditional) belief operators.
Proposition 16. Consider an epistemic model having the properties specified in Definition 1. Then B 0 Ap{aaW | A is strongly believed at a} pB(W)A.
As suggested by Battigalli and Bonanno (1999) , the dstrong beliefT operator may also be defined w.r.t. other subcollections of U than the collection of subsets that correspond to subgames, and may be seen as a generalization of robust belief by not necessarily requiring belief to be babsolutely robustQ in the sense of Stalnaker (1998) . However, provided that W is included, Proposition 16 still holds. In any case, the dstrong beliefT operator shares the properties of robust belief: Also dstrong beliefT satisfies the properties of Proposition 13, but is not monotonic.
Concluding remarks
In order to compare and reconcile four non-monotonic operators that have recently been used to provide epistemic foundations for game-theoretic solution concepts, we have analyzed a framework where a serial, transitive, forwardly linear and quasi-backwardly linear accessibility relation Q of epistemic priority, and a vector of nested, serial, transitive and Euclidean accessibility relations (R 1 , . . ., R L ) are derived from the preferences of a decision maker. The two kinds of accessibility relations give equivalent representations of the notions of dsubjective possibilityT and depistemic priorityT, which are the essential building blocks when deriving belief operators. The framework thus provides semantics for preference-based belief operators.
We have used Q and (R 1 , . . ., R L ) to define and characterize certain and conditional belief, which are KD45 operators, and robust belief, which is not, as it does not satisfy monotonicity. We have reconciled Stalnaker's (1998) dabsolutely robust beliefT, Brandenburger and Keisler's (2002) dassumptionT, Asheim and Dufwenberg's (2003) dfull beliefT, and Battigalli and Siniscalchi's (2002) dstrong beliefT by showing how the three former operators coincide with, while the latter is closely related to, robust belief.
Our framework does not require that Q is reflexive. The decision maker may be subjectively unable to distinguish between two objectively possible states, while deeming (at the lowest epistemic level) that one is subjectively possible and the other not. Because Q lacks reflexivity, not even the certain belief operator obeys the truth axiom; thus, we allow that the decision maker holds the true state as subjectively impossible (even at the lowest epistemic level).
The analysis of this paper has been based solely on one-person decision theory. However, the derived belief operators are intended to be used for interactive analysis in the multi-person setting of games. In the context of a two-person game, the uncertainty faced by player i concerns (a) his opponent j's strategy choice, (b) j's preferences over acts from i's strategy choices to outcomes, and so on (see Tan and Werlang, 1988) . A type of player i corresponds to (a) preferences over acts from j's strategy choices, (b) preferences over acts from pairs of j's strategy choice and j's preferences over acts from i's strategy choices, and so on. Such infinite interactive hierarchies can be modeled explicitly, or implicitly by letting, for each player i, i have preferences over acts from his opponent j's strategy-type pairs to randomized outcomes (see, e.g., Bfge and Eisele, 1979; Mertens and Zamir, 1985; Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993; Epstein and Wang, 1996 ).
An implicit model with a finite set of types for each player, as considered by Stalnaker (1998) and Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) , and to which the present paper provides a contributing framework, does not allow for dpreference-completenessT, where, for each player i, there exists some type of i for any feasible preferences that i may have. 6 Still, even a finite implicit model gives rise to infinite hierarchies of first-order preferences, second-order preferences, and so on. As a thought experiment one can in principle, for any naN, elicit player i's nth order preferences by subjecting i to appropriately designed bets.
In effect, we assume that each player as a decision maker is able to represent his subjective hierarchy of preferences by means of a finite implicit model. Then, at the true profile of types, the two players' subjective hierarchies can be embedded in a single implicit model that includes the types of the two players that are needed to represent each player's hierarchy. Such a construction can fruitfully be used to analyze a wide range of game-theoretic concepts (see, e.g., Asheim, in press).
However, when embedding the two player's subjective hierarchies into a single implicit model, it is illegitimate to require that player i deems the true type of his opponent j subjectively possible. Rather, we cannot rule out that, at the true type profile, player j's true type is not needed to represent player i's subjective hierarchy of preferences; this is particularly relevant for the analysis of non-equilibrium gametheoretic concepts. Hence, when applying finite implicit models for interactive analysis of games, it is important to allow-as we do in the framework of the present paperthe decision maker to hold objectively possible opponent preferences as subjectively impossible.
6 dPreference-completenessT is needed for the interactive epistemic analyses of Brandenburger and Keisler (2002) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) , but not for the analysis of Asheim and Dufwenberg (2003) . Brandenburger and Keisler (1999) show that there need not exist a dpreference-completeT interactive epistemic model when preferences are not representable by subjective probabilities. 
Then x=x 0 , x mÀ1 d a x m for all m={1, . . ., n} (since baA and ca IA imply that bH a c), and x n d a y (since x n weakly dominates y at a with u a (x n (b 0 ))Nu a ( y(b 0 ))). By transitivity of v a , it follows that xd a y. 5
If a is Savage-null at a, then there exists bas a such that b is not Savage-null at a since v a is nontrivial (Axiom 3). Clearly, a is not infinitely more likely than b at a, and aQb. If a is not Savage-null at a, then aQa since a is not infinitely more likely than itself at a.
(Q transitive.) We must show that aQb and bQc imply aQc. Clearly, aQb and bQc imply acbcc, and that c is not Savage-null at a. It remains to be shown that aH a c does not hold if aQb and bQc. Suppose to the contrary that aH a c. It suffices to show that aQb contradicts bQc. Since c is not Savage-null at acb, bH a c is needed to contradict bQc. This follows from partitional priority (Axiom 6) because aQb entails that aH a b does not hold.
(Q satisfies forward linearity.) We must show that aQb and aQc imply bQc or cQb. From aQb and aQc it follows that acbcc and that both b and c are not Savage-null at bcc. Since bH b c and cH c b cannot both hold, we have that bQc or cQb. (Q satisfies quasi-backward linearity.) We must show that aQc and bQc imply aQb or bQa if aaVW such that aVQb. From aQc and bQc it follows that acbcc, while aVQb implies that b is not Savage-null at aVcacb. If a is Savage-null at a, then aH a b cannot hold, implying that aQb. If a is not Savage-null at acb, then aH a b and bH b a cannot both hold, implying that aQb or bQa. 5
We must show that aR k b and bR k c imply aR k c. Since aR k b implies that acb, we have that q k a =q k b . Now, bR k c (i.e., caq k b ) implies aR k c (i.e., caq k a ). (R k Euclidean.) We must show that aR k b and aR k c imply bR k c. Since aR k b implies that acb, we have that q k a =q k b . Now, aR k c (i.e., caq k a ) implies bR k c (i.e., caq k b ). (aR k b implies aR k+1 b.) This follows from the property that q k a pq k+1 a . (ac such that aR k+1 c and bR k+1 c) implies (acV such that aR k cV and bR k cV). Since aR k+1 c implies that acc and bR k+1 c implies that bcc, we have that acb and q k a =q k b . Hence, by the non-emptiness of this set, acV such that aR k cV and bR k cV. 5
Proof [Proposition 5].
(i) (aQa is equivalent to a being not Savage-null at a.) If aQa, then it follows directly from Definition 2 that a is not Savage-null at a. 
, and cQc by Proposition 5(i). Since b,cas a and cQc, it follows by quasi-backward linearity of Q that cQb or bQc. However, since by construction, 8ka{1, . . ., S À1}, q k a \/=t, there is no ka{1, . . ., S À1} such that cR k b and not bR k c or vice versa, and Proposition 5(ii) implies that both cQb and bQc must hold. In particular, cQb. If, on the other hand, ca(s a \/)\q S a , then by Definition 3 cR S b and not bR S c, implying by Proposition 5(ii) that cQb. Thus, 8cas a \/, cQb, and bab a (/) follows. 
